Monday, July 26, 2004
Behind the Music (or the brief)
Paul D. Clement, Acting Solicitor General
It was easy to find information on the SG. General Clement’s impressive resume is summarized in this DOJ press release.
Christopher Wray , Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice
Another easy one. The DOJ has documented his background on their web site.
Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General
Ok, now it starts to get a little harder to find out who these folks are. Here’s what I know.
Mr. Dreeben attended college at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and received his law degree from Duke University. He was admitted to the bar in 1982 and has argued 29 cases before the Supreme Court. A few notable cases include: Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, Bailey v. United States, Koon v. United States, Harris v. United States, and United States v. Cotton.
James A. Feldman, Assistant to the Solicitor General
Mr. Felman has a BA from the University of Pennsylvania and a JD from Harvard Law School. He was admitted to the bar in 1983.
Nina Goodman, Attorney - Department of Justice
Nina's a mystery to me. I wasn't able to find a single piece of biographical information. Can anyone help?
Elizabeth Olson, Attorney - Department of Justice Criminal DIvision
Ms. Olson is a 2002 graduate of Northwestern Law School and served as a law clerk to Judge Guido Calabresi on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Ms. Olson has two publications on Lexis. Fans of irony won’t want to miss reading the opening paragraph of the following article:
The Constitution requires that prosecutors prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element that constitutes the crime charged against a criminal defendant. 1 For many years, legislatures have sidestepped this constitutional requirement by denying that certain aspects of a crime are "elements." Legislatures have instead labeled these aspects "affirmative defenses" 2 or "rebuttable presumptions" 3 and thus transferred to the defendant the burden of proving their presence or absence. More recently, state legislatures and Congress have used the term "sentencing factors" 4 to shift fact-finding responsibility regarding certain aspects of a crime from the jury to the judge, effectively lowering the required standard of proof from "beyond reasonable doubt" to "preponderance of evidence." 5
Elizabeth A. Olson, COMMENT: RETHINKING MANDATORY MINIMUMS AFTER APPRENDI, 96 Nw. U.L. Rev. 811 (2002).